Introduction
Did you know, that in the last forty years, thirty-four new countries have been recognized by the UN? The most recent of these was in South Sudan in 2011. Many of these countries, such as South Sudan, have gained statehood through independence. Independence is one way to gain statehood, but has many forms of being achieved. A state can become independent diplomatically, such as Montenegro in 2005, or violently, such as South Sudan. When looking at which areas of the world could be the newest country to join the UN, one region is different from all the rest. This region is Iraqi Kurdistan. An autonomous region, this group of people has been pursuing independence for years. This paper aims to explore the possibility of an independent Kurdistan in the near future, and how they might achieve independence.
Background
The beginning of the Kurdish search for independence began in 1916 with the Sykes-Picot agreement, which divided the Middle East into areas of British and French influence and created modern Middle Eastern borders.[1] Four years later, the Treaty of Sevres dissolved the Ottoman Empire and included a clause that would have created an independent Kurdish State; however, Sevres was rejected by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which had no mention of the Kurdish people.[2] While the rejection of the Treaty of Sevres was a disaster for the Kurds and their desire for independence, it began the independence movements and gave the Kurdish people a desire for independence.
The first major push for an independent homeland for Kurdish people was in 1946 in Northwestern Iran. With the help of the Soviet Union, Kurdish leader Qazi Muhammad established the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.[3] The Republic of Mahabad was short lived, as the Soviet Union withdrew from Northwestern Iran two months after the creation of the Republic and allowed Iranian forces to overrun the fledging nation and arrest Qazi Muhammad, who was hanged a year later.[4]
One titular figure escaped the Iranian grasp of Mahabad; Mustafa Barzani. Considered the father of Kurdish nationalism, Barzani escaped to Iraq following the collapse of Mahabad and established the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq.[5] After years of pushing the Iraqi government for a Kurdish autonomous region and unfulfilled promises from the government; in 1961 Barzani decided to promote a Kurdish rebellion. Changes in Iraqi government paused fighting at times, but fighting always resumed due to failures to reach an agreement regarding Kurdish autonomy.[6]
These movements were large in terms of Kurdish history, but there are a few other events that occurred that can provide historical insight to the Kurdish cause. The Baath party in both Syria and Iraq attempted to “Arabize” their northern regions, which were heavily populated with Kurds, by displacing Kurdish people from the region and their resources and move Arabs in to secure the Arab ethnicity in Kurdish dominated lands.[7] Later, both Iran and Iraq carried out systematic genocide of Kurdish regions. Iran’s occurred during the Iranian revolution, when Kurds attempted to take advantage of the chaos and create a state in Western Iran. This revolution was quelled by Ayatollah forces and many Kurds were killed and displaced.[8] In the late 80s, Saddam Hussein carried out the al-Anfal campaign, also known as the Kurdish Genocide, where “mass killings, the destruction of thousands of villages, and the use of chemical weapons against civilians” resulted in the deaths of between 50,000 to 180,000 Kurds.[9]
Finally, after decades of war and violence, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 proved to be the catalyst for Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. The Kurds played a strong role in the creation of a new Iraqi constitution, which provide them with stronger political participation and civil rights.[10] Despite this win for Iraqi Kurds, there are still many active movements for Kurdish people in states like Syria, Iran, and Turkey.
Current Issues
According to the Center of Foreign Relations, the source for a majority of this section on history, the standing of the Kurdish people varies by country. In Iraq, Kurdish people have representation, but are currently arguing to be allowed to vote for independence.
Before exploring whether or not an independent Kurdistan is a viable possibility, it is important to explore current political issues. For this we can take a look at the 2017 Kurdish Independence Referendum in Iraq. The new constitution following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq established an autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).[11] In 2017, the KRG held a referendum exploring the desire for an independent Kurdish state, a step taken before formally requesting an independence vote from the central Iraqi government. The referendum asked one question “Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani areas outside the region’s administration to become an independent state?”[12] The vote concluded with 93% of the participants voting yes.
The referendum turned out to be disastrous for Kurdish people desiring independence. After the referendum, Iraqi forces responded by capturing Kirkuk from the Kurdish forces and removing the KRG appointed governor.[13] This loss of power was a result of and exacerbated KRG infighting between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). When the Iraqi forces entered Kirkuk, they found government buildings empty and Kurdish forces drawn away; and it was discovered that the PUK ordered forces away after striking a deal with Baghdad and Iran.[14]
After Kirkuk and many key areas of Kurdistan were lost, both the KDP and PUK, who both during events surrounding the referendum often switched between supporting the referendum and opposing it, spent years blaming each other on the losses.[15] If Kurdistan were to push for independence, it is important that KDP and PUK infighting cease so that action for independence be unified and strong.
In addition to political issues, there are two key issues that could prevent an independent Kurdistan. These issues are the presence of fossil fuel resources in the area, and the lack of global support for an independent Kurdistan.
When exploring the possibility of an independent Kurdistan, it is important to understand the energy resources in Iraqi Kurdistan. The area of Iraqi Kurdistan has around 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, which is 3% of global gas reserves.[16] This is a large amount of natural gas, especially for Iraq, which depends on natural gas for electricity. In addition, Iraqi Kurdistan “controls the majority of Iraq’s non-associated gas fields.”[17] In addition to natural gas, Kurdistan holds a large amount of oil resources. The Energy Information Administration estimates that Kurdistan contains around 3.7 billion barrels of oil resources; while the KRG claims they have 45 billion barrels due to unproven reserves and disputed oil field claims with Baghdad.[18] Additionally, the KRG produces around 445,000 b/d of oil, which is around 10% of total Iraqi daily supply.[19] The large amount of natural gas and oil reserves claimed and produced by Kurdistan is a problem for independence as it seems unlikely that Iraq would be willing to give those resources up very easily.
Another issue with a potential independent Kurdistan is the lack of international support for independence. Without international support, it is unlikely that any sort of independence movement would be successful. During the referendum, many countries followed the United States in condemning the actions of the KRG.[20] However, Kurdistan is not alone on the international stage, as historically Israel has supported Kurdish independence movements, as Israel is “always seeking regional, non-Arab allies.”[21]
There are many issues to be considered when exploring the possibility of an independent Kurdistan. Political infighting the KRG, the presence of fossil fuels, and a lack of global support are all valid concerns when understanding the potential chance of a new nation. In addition to those concerns, it also important to understand how regional and key international actors would react to an independence movement in Kurdistan.
International Response
When exploring the possibility of an independent Kurdistan, it is important to understand how regional actors would react to an independence movement by the KRG. Different types of independence movements can bring different reactions, and this section will be covering diplomatic independence movements and violent ones.
Turkey is an interesting country to look at when considering regional actor reactions to an independent Kurdistan. Similar to Iraq, Turkey has a Kurdish minority that has been a part of their domestic concerns for decades.[22] The Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) has had many acts of violence in their fight for independence, but has not had the same success as the KDP and PUK.[23] Despite this, Turkey has recently changed their stance of opposition to an independent Iraqi Kurdistan due to “domestic political changes, growing energy needs, expanding bilateral trade with the Kurdistan Regional Government, and increasing political uncertainty in Iraq and Syria.” [24]
Increasing relationships between Turkey and the KRG may mean that a diplomatic push for independence may be ignored by the Turkish government, and perhaps even encourage as “slow and steady progress toward Kurdish independence has significant political and economic advantages.”[25] However, a violent independence movement may turn Turkish support away and perhaps bring Turkish retribution, as a successful violent independence movement may embolden Kurdish separatists in Turkey.
Syria is very similar in response as Turkey; however, their situation with the Kurdish population in their northern region is vastly different. Currently, Syrian Kurds control much of Syria’s northern region. While a diplomatic independence movement of Iraqi Kurds may not mean much to Syria, Syria will not support a violent Kurdish movement in Northern Iraq as it may embolden the Kurdish movement within its own borders. However, due to the current situation in Syria, the Syrian government may not be able to do much but condemn a violent independence movement.
Iran’s reaction to an independent Kurdistan is also similar to the Turkish response. While Iran fears the potential of an independent Kurdistan due to the potential to “embolden its own large population of repressed Kurds,” Iran could “tolerate an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq if it judges that it would not threaten Iranian stability.”[26] This shows that if Iraqi Kurdistan gains independence peacefully and diplomatically, Iran will likely not oppose the movement. An independence movement with violent means will likely draw condemnation from the Iranian regime, however due to recent trade deals made between the KRG and Iran, a violent independence movement could be ignored by Iran if the “financial benefits ultimately outweigh Iranian concerns over Kurdish nationalism.”[27]
The last international actor to explore is the United States of America. As a nation with a large presence in Iraq, it is important to understand what stance they may take during an independence movement in Kurdistan. During the 2017 referendum, the United States warned against the vote as they believed it could “increase tensions with Turkey, Iran, and Syria.”[28] As tensions increased after the referendum, they have since ceased due to warming relations between the KRG and Turkey/Iran. This warning was created in desire for a peaceful situation in the region. If the KRG pursued diplomatic independence, the United States would likely remain a neutral party; however, in a violent uprising, it can be expected to see the United States condemn violence in desire for peace.
Options for Independence
When exploring the potential for an independent Kurdistan, it is important to explore the options in which Kurdistan could achieve independence. There are three primary ways that Kurdistan could achieve independence; militarily, diplomatically, and legislatively.
The first option for Kurdistan to achieve independence is through military action. The largest advantage that Kurdistan has for this option is the Peshmerga, a fighting force of over 200,000 containing small arms, light vehicles, MANPADs, and a small air force.[29] This is a significant fighting force; however, its major issue is the lack of centralized leadership due to KDP-PUK infighting. Additionally, the Peshmerga would be fighting at a disadvantage as they were removed from strongholds following the 2017 referendum. This option also brings the possibility of regional actors joining Iraq in quelling the rebellion due to domestic concerns mentioned previously. If Iraq does not receive any support from regional actors, “the Kurdistan region can field enough forces to hold their own and defend their borders”; however, if a coalition of Iranian, Iraqi, Turkish, and Syrian forces were formed, then the Peshmerga would not stand a chance.[30]
The second option for Kurdistan to achieve independence is through diplomatic action. This option was last tried in 2017 and had disastrous results for the Kurdish people. However, as KRG relations with regional nations have improved, and KDP-PUK infighting has simmered in recent years, there is a chance that this option is more viable than five years ago. The strongest issue with the diplomatic option is the presence of fossil fuels in the region. If the KRG were able to broker an agreement with Baghdad regarding those resources to gain independence, then the chances of the diplomatic option are greatly increased.
The third option for Kurdistan to achieve independence is through legislative action. Out of the 329 seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives, Kurdish parties won 58.[31] If the Kurdish parties were to win enough seats or create a pro-Kurdistan coalition, they could formally vote to secede from Iraq and create an independent Kurdistan. This option is a mix for the first two, and may have the consequences of both.
Conclusion
When exploring the possibility of an independent Kurdistan, it is important to understand the current issues, international response, and options for independence. Issues such as KDP-PUK infighting, regional presence of fossil fuel resources, and global support allow for an understanding of what may prevent Kurdistan from gaining its independence. Understanding the response of neighboring nations and key international actors is important to understand Kurdistan’s regional relationships and if the KRG needs to worry about international intervention if it pursues independence. Additionally, exploring the means in which Kurdistan can gain its independence is necessary to understand if it is possible for Kurds to have their own nation and what option seems the most feasible for independence.
This paper recommends that Kurdistan pursues the diplomatic option. The legislative option seems to have little chance for success due to pure demographics. The option for independence with violence is not advisable as well due to potential retaliation from regional action and a massive loss in life and extreme damage that is likely to occur in a violent action. This paper advises that a diplomatic action is the best option to achieve independence, as Kurds can try and create their own state without violence or international intervention. The issues, international response, and options for independence show that it will not be an easy venture if the KRG decides to strongly pursue independence; but when has independence ever been easy?
References
1-2, 5-10, 23 Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). Timeline: The Kurds’ quest for independence. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.cfr.org/timeline/kurds-quest-independence
3-4, 11-12 Ozoglu, H., & Hanso, H. (2017, December 5). Creating an independent Kurdistan: The history of a hundred-year-Long Dream. Maydan. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://themaydan.com/2017/10/creating-independent-kurdistan-history-hundred-year-long-dream/
13-14 Khalil, L. (2020, June 6). Worst enemy: Kurdistan’s history of infighting. The Interpreter. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/worst-enemy-kurdistan-s-history-infighting
15 Mamshai, Farhad. (2018). PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk. Jadavpur Journal of International Relations. 22. 097359841877094. 10.1177/0973598418770948.
16-17 Aziz, S. (2022, August 29). Iraqi Kurdistan Gas Resources: The icarus adventure. epc.ae. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/iraqi-kurdistan-gas-resources-the-icarus-adventure
18-19 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2022, September 28). Executive summary. Homepage – U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Iraq/#:~:text=According%20to%20Rystad%20estimates%2C%20as,billion%20barrels%20of%20oil%20resources.&text=The%20KRG%20estimate%20of%2045,the%20disputed%20Kirkuk%20area%20fields.
20-21, 28 Ottaway, M. (2017, September). United States policy and the Kurdistan referendum: Compounding the problem. Wilson Center. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/united-states-policy-and-the-kurdistan-referendum-compounding-the-problem
22 Simon, D. (2017, September 27). Why the U.S. should support Kurdish independence. Forbes. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/09/27/why-the-u-s-should-support-kurdish-independence/?sh=41ba91cf3a08
24-27 Nader, A., Hanauer, L., Allen, B., & Scotten, A. G. (2016, November 14). How an independent Kurdistan might impact its neighbors. RAND Corporation. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1452.html
29-30 Meintjes, A. (2018) The Complications of Kurdish Independence. Open Journal of Political Science, 8, 1-11. doi: 10.4236/ojps.2018.81001.
31 Blanchard, C. (2021). Iraq’s October 2021 Election (CRS Report No. IN11769). Retrieved from Congressional Research Service website: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11769